The secretary problem with uncertain selection, considered by Smith, is generalized to allow for the rejection probability to be rank-dependent. That is, if an offer of employment is given to the j-th best applicant, she rejects it with probability q j , 1 < j <, n ( n is the number of applicants to appear).
Introduction
Before discussing our problems, we review briefly the Smith [6] problem. A set of n rankable applicants (1 being the best and n the worst) appears before us one at a time in random order with all n! permutations equally likely. Each time an applicant appears, we only observe the rank of the applicant relative to those preceding her and decide, based on the observed rank, whether to make an offer of selection to the current applicant or to pass over her and observe the next (if any). When an offer is given, the applicant accepts(rejects) it with a known fixed probability p(q = 1 -p), independent of the rank of the applicant and all else. If the applicant rejects an offer, we further observe the next. No recall of the previous applicants is allowed and the process continues until an offer is accepted(i.e., an applicant is selected) or the final stage is reached with no offer accepted. The objective is to find a policy that will maximize the probability of selecting the best overall. We shall abbreviate the event "selecting the best overall" to the single word success.
In this paper, we generalize the Smith problem to allow the probability of acceptance (rejection) to be rank-dependent. That is, for instance, if an offer is given to the j-th best applicant, she accepts(rejects) it with probability pj(qi = 1 -p;), 1 < j < n, independent of all else. We assume 0 < qj < 1, unless otherwise specified and sometimes refer to the Smith problem as rank-independent problem for the sake of contrast.
In Section 2, we attempt to derive the optimality equations of our problems. When an applicant appears, the decision of either making an offer or not must be based not only on the relative rank of the current applicant but also on the sequence of the relative ranks of the applicants that refused an offer previously (if any), because in the rank-dependent case our knowledge about the true rank of the current applicant undergoes the Bayesian updating through these information. For any given sequence {qi ; 1 5 j < n}, the optimality equations are given by Eq.(2.7). These equations can be solved in principle recursively to optimal policy and the success probability, because by(ii, a , G ) is calculable from t us call an applicant a candidate for simplicity if she is best among those observed atively best applicant. Then Eq.(2.7) tells us that the optimal policy only to candidate(s) (this is intuitive but not a priori clear). mith [6] showed that, in the rank-independent case, the optimal policy falls under the category of the threshold rule, when we call a policy threshold rule or more specifically r-threshold rule if the policy passes over the first r -1 applicants and then makes an offer successively to candidates that appear. However, giving general guidelines of the optimal policy seems difficult in the rank-dependent case. To have some meaningful results, we must restrict ourselves to some class of the sequences. Let us now define the problem as the m-problem if the sequence -jqj; 1 < j < n } satisfies qm+i = qm+2 = = qn, 0 <, m < n -1.
We can regard the value m as a parameter that regulates the difficulty of the problem (as m gets larger, the problem becomes harder). As shown in Section 3, this restriction brings considerable simplification to the corresponding optimality equations. The 0-problem is, of course, the rank-independent problem tre ed by Smith [6] . The 1-problem is shown to be essentially equivalent to the 0-problem. r main concerns in this paper are to solve the 2-~roblem. In this problem, the form of the optimal policy differs depending on which of the two values qs and q3 (= q4 = a a = ) is larger. It can be shown that the optimal policy becomes a threshold rule if qs > 03 hile, when n is sufficiently large, there exists e optimal policy makes an offer alt ately to candidates that < g3 (see Theorem 3.5). In Section , we solve the %problem numerically and observe that the optimal policy becomes very complicated for some set of values of q-^, q3 and q4 (= 5 = m -= qn). The m-problems for m > 4 are left for a future study.
From the practical point of view, it is very important to consider the monotone sequence, i.e., qi > g'2 > -a > qn7 because, in the real world, the better the applicant is, the most likely it seems that she refuses an offer with the larger probability. In the light of the computational results from the 3-~roblem, in addition to the analytical results from the 0-, 1-and 2-problems, we'd like to make the following conjecture : If the sequence {gj; 1 <, j < n} satisfies the condition q1 > q2 2 2 qrn then the optimal policy becomes a threshold rule.
The authours believe that this conjecture is a challenging problem.
For related works with uncertain selection, see ~etruccelli [4] ,Tamaki [7] , [g] and McNamara and Collins [2] (treated in the game theoretic approach). For a history and review of the secretary problem, the reader is referred to Ferguson [l] and Samuels [5] .
that rejected an offer (if any), relative to these observations. After the ( r -l)-st decision, suppose that the ranks of the applicants that rejected an offer (if any) relative to the first r -1 constitute the set (il, , ik) C Nr-1. This set (il, , ik) is referred to as rejection history and assumed to be arranged in ascending order, i.e., il < < ik. If r -1 = n, the trial terminates with no applicant selected and leads to a failure; otherwise the relative rank Xr ? Nr of the r-th applicant is observed. The probability law of Xr depends on the rejection history and hence we denote by pr(i; il,
, ik) the conditional probability of Xr = i given the rejection history (ll, , ik) at time r -1. (Observe that, for example, pr (i; h -, ik) = l /^ for the rank-independent case). Assume now that the rejection history is (ll, . , ik) and Xr = i has just been observed. If the r-th decision is 01, then the process terminates if the offer is accepted; otherwise the process continues updating (il , , ik) to
If the r-th decision is a2, then the process continues updating ( ? l , , G) to (?l, , Qi, where Unless the process terminates thereby, the subsequent applicant with relative rank Xr+1 is observed. Xr+1 will take value j with p r~b a b i l i t y p~+~( j ;
(L -, depending on whether the decision taken at time r is al or a2. If no rejection has occurred so far, rejection history (il , , if:) is to be interpreted as an empty set 4.
Formally then, we have a finite horizon Markov decision process with Sr = {(z; i\ , . , ik) :
as the collection of states at time r ; K = {al, a2} as the action space ; and transition probabilities pr(< h, , ik), 1 < r < n as described above. Denote by 11 the set of (deterministic, Markov) policies T T ( T T~, , 7rn), where TTr : Sr -+ K, 1 <: r <: n. , ik) C Nr7 1 5 r 5 n be defined as the probability that all offers will be rejected, provided that k offers were made respectively to il-th best, a -, and to h-th best among the first r applicants. More specifically, if we denote by C(r, i -, n), 1 < i 5 r, l < r 5 n the i-th best among the first r applicants when the total number of applicants is n and denote by A(r, i; n) the absolute rank of C(r, i; n), i.e., A(r, i; n) = j if C(r7 I; n) is C(n, j\ n), then we can write where E represents the expectation with respect to random variables {A(r, i~ n), 1 < t < k}.
For an empty set we assume a, (4) = 1. Whereas ar (il, -m a , ik) is defined for the entire population of size n having sequence l < j < n}, similar quantity br(il, ---, ik) can be defined for the subpopulation of size n -1, which is constructed by taking out the best applicant from the entire population. Thus, for (il, -
Note that, for this subpopulation, the j-th best rejects an offer with probability qj+l, l < j < n -1 . We now have the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.1
For (i; il, --. , ik) E Sr, l 5 r 5 n,
Proof.
See Appendix A.1.
See Appendix A.2. Now define . , i t ) = <lr(i1, " . , i k ) v r (~l q " ' ,Ãˆk)/p1 Then applying Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 to Eq.(2.3), we have the following form of the optimality equation with Va(il , ik) 0. Eq4(2.6) immediately shows that the optimal policy is independent of p1 and so is V* = G(+), which is interpreted as the probabiEty of making an offer to the best applicant. As a performance measure we use V* instead of v*(= plV*) to save parameter. Eq.(2.6) can be further simpliged to because the optimal policy is shown to make an offer only to candidates (this property of the optimal policy is intuitive but not a priori clear). To prove this, it suEces to show that K(il, m , ik) does not increase with additional rejection. Before showing this, we examine some properties of ar(il, -, ik) and bp(il
Lemma 2.3
ar(il, , ik) and br(il, . ? ik) have the following properties (properties (ii) and (iii) are only described in terms of ar(il, , ik), because br(il, , ik) has apparently the same nature as ap(il, g , ik) from its construction). (ii) ar(il, + , ik) does not increase with an additional rejection. That is, for (i17 , ik) C Nr-x and i E Nr,
Praaf. See Appendix A.3.
Remarks (2.1)
l. ap(i1? -ik) c m be given in a closed form for a particular sequence {qj; l 5 j 5 n]* For example, if qj E q, j 2 2, then
is non-decreasing(non-increasing) in i, which agrees with our intuition.
3. To solve Eq. (2*7) recursively, br (il , a a a ik) must be at hand, (2.9) gives an efficient way for calculating bp (il , . -, ik).
Eq.(2=7) is now an i m e d i a t e consequence of the fogowing lemma which states that the optimal value function K(i17 -ik) inherits some properties of ar(ily Q ik) (or bv(il . ik)).
Lemma 2*4
(i) 'b$(il, a ik) does not increase with an additional rejection* That is, for (il, , ik) C and i E Nr7
(2.10)
(ii) Assume that {gi; 2 5 j 5 n ] be a 110n-increasing(n0n-decreming) sequence of j. Then
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We conclude this section with a simple example.
EXAMPLE (n=4)
A bit of calculation from Eq.(2.7) shows that, when n=4, the optimal policy becomes a threshold rule (more specifically l-or 2-threshold rule) for any sequence {qj; 1 5 j 5 4). et q4 be fixed aad denote by Qi(q4) the set of values (q3? q2) for which the optimal policy remains ;-threshold rule$ = 2. Then, the entire set {(q3? q2
is partitioned into Qx(q4) and Q2(q4) and the indiEerence curve qs = j(q3 1 q4)(bounday between Ql(q4) and Q2(g4)) is given by Moreover we have
Optimal Policy of the m-problem
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the m-problem,0 5 m 5 n -1. To make explicit the dependence on the same probability q(= q m +~ = q m +~ = a g = qfi)7 the m-problem is sometimes written as the (m7 q)-problem* Let us start with the following lemmas? which is intuitively dear from the definitions of ar(ilT -m i k ) and br(ilt -+ , ik) (The proof can be made rigorous by inductio~ on T-from Lemma 2.3(i)). 
Lemma 2.2 shows that, in state (1; h,. , h) E SF, the current candidate is judged to be the overall best with probability For the m-problem, this probability is reduced, from Lemma 3.1, to which implies that, concerning this probability, rejection history (ii, , ik), ik > m, is identified with (4) or (il, , it) depending on whether > m, k > 1 or il < m 5 ik, k > 2, where l = max{t : < m -l , l < t < k}. This fact suggests that, concerning the optimal decision to be made, rejection history (h, , ik), ik > ml is also identified with (4) or (il , , h ) depending on whether i\ > m, k > 1 or i\ < m < k > 2. The following lemma justifies this suggestion and brings consequent simplification of the optimality equation. 
Proof. See Appendix B.I.
From Lemma 3.2, the element in the rejection history becomes immaterial if it turns out to be none of m bests. Thus, to describe the evolution of the process, it suffices to consider only 2 m 1 basic rejection histories (4), (il) with 1 < il 5 m -1,and (il,. , ? l ) with G < m -1.1 > 2(note that, when m = 1, Lemma 3.2 states that K(il, , ik) = Q^K(4), k 2 1 and the only basic rejection history is (4)). Table 1 gives a list of the basic rejection histories for m=l,2,3 and 4. Figure 1 illustrates the transition of the basic rejection history for m=2 The following lemma gives the differential form of Eq.(2.7), which can be used to derive the asymptotic solution of the problem. that r / n --+ X , we obtain (3.4) if we put
1-problem
The only basic rejection history is (4) and the corresponding optimality equation is given by Eq. (3.3) , which is essentially the same as is derived by Srnith [6] (compare this with Eq.(9) in page 622) and can be solved to yield Lemma 3. 4 The optimal policy of the (1, (^-problem is ro-threshold rule, where
The optimal value is given by
The asymptotic results are as follows. 
2-problem
The basic rejection histories of the 2-problem are (4) and ( l ) , and the corresponding opti- These equations can be solved and then summarized as follows.
Theorem 3.5 The (2, ^-problem is distinguished into two cases depending on whether <h 2 q or 92 q.
Case 1 : q2 > q (i) Form of the optimal policy. The optimal policy is ro-threshold rule.
(ii) Formula for critical number. ro is the smallest integer r such that where, for r < k, (i) Form of the optimal policy. The optimal policy can be described in terms of the two integers 7-1 and rg (l 5 rl < r2 < n) as follows: The optimal policy passes over the first rl -1 applicants. On time interval [ r l , r2 -l], the optimal policy makes an offer to candidates alternately, that is, it makes an offer to the first candidate; it then makes no offer to the second candidate; it then makes an offer to the third candidate, and so forth (when rl = r2, interval [ r 1 ri -l] shrinks). If no offer has been accepted by r2 -1, the optimal policy then makes an offer successively to each candidate that appears.
(ii) Formulae for critical numbers. r2 is the smallest integer r such that
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Secretary Problem with Uncertain Selection
Define, for given 7-2, where Then if rl is the smallest integer r ( < r2 -1) such that Otherwise = r2.
(iii) Probability of making an offer to the best. To have an intuitive feeling to the form of the optimal policies described in Theorem 3.5, it might be helpful to consider two extreme cases, i.e., q2 = 1 and q = 0 as Case 1, and q 2 = 0 and q = 1 as Case 2. Imagine a situation where a candidate(referred to as A) rejected an offer and the next candidate(referred to as B) has just arrived. In the former case, B turns out to be the very best at this instant and consequently the optimal policy makes an offer to B, which implies that the optimal policy is a threshold rule. In the latter case, A turns out to be neither the best nor the second best at this instant and hence, if time is not matured, i.e., if the arrival time of B is not too late, B is judged to be non-best with large probability and possibly passed by. This is why the optimal policy is not necessarily a threshold rule in the latter case. Tables 2 and 3 respectively give the numerical values of ro and V* (in Case 1 ) and r l , and V* (in Case 2) for some values of n and (qa Q . ) . Table 4 contains the numerical values Table 2 ro and V* for some values of n and (q2, q) in Case 1 ( upper is ro and lower is V* ) Table 3 r l , r2 and V* for some values of n and (q2, q) in Case 2 ( upper is r l , middle is 7-2 and lower is V* ) (ii) F2 is decreasing in q2, but not necessarily decreasing in q.
(iii) V is increasing both in q2 and q.
( v ) Whereas TQ and Fi are both no greater than e l , f-2 can be greater than e l .
%problem
Here we give some computational results for the 3-problem because solving this problem analytically seems difficult. The optimality equations of the (3, g)-problem are given as follows, each corresponding to the basic rejection histories (+), (l) , (2) and (1, 2) .
Then, from (3.18)-(3.21), G(<^), G(1), G(2) and G(l,2) represent the optimal stopping regions, each corresponding to the basic rejection histories (<^) , (l) , (2) and (1,2).
We examined g3=729 cases letting qz, q3 and q respectively run from 0.1 to 0.9 by 0.1 with n=100 fixed, and S2=25 cases letting q2 and q respectively run from 0.1 to 0.9 by 0.2 with n=1000 and q=0.3 fixed(see Table 5 for the latter). Computational experiences show that, in each case, the optimal policy is time isotone, that is, there exist four integers s (4) , s (l), S (2) and s(192) such that G ( <^) = { r : r ; > s ( < W , G ( l ) = { r : r ; > s ( l ) } G ( 2 ) = { r : r > s ( 2 ) } , G ( 1 9 2 ) = { r : r > s ( 1 , 2 ) } . Table 5 The type of the optimal policy and the critical numbers for the 3-problem with re=10000 and q=0.3 fixed. For each type, only the effective numbers are given Table 5 
It is easy to see that, from Figure 1 Let tl , t2 , be the arrival times of the candidates on that interval. At time t17 Tl makes an offer to the first candidate because the basic rejection history is now (4) and tl >, S(+). If this offer is rejected, then the basic rejection history changes from (4) and Tl makes no offer to the second candidate due to t2 < s(1). The basic rejection history then changes from (1) to (2) and Tl makes no offer to the third candidate due to t3 < s(2), and the basic rejection history again moves back to (4) from (2). Thus Tl restarts over again with basic rejection history (4) from time t3 onward, and so Tl makes an offer to the fourth candidate and make no offer to the fifth and sixth candidates, and so forth. To describe the cyclic property of the optimal policy on each interval, it is convenient to introduce a cyclic rule Rn,,n7 m, n 2 0, which makes an offer to the first m candidates successively and then makes no offer to the next n candidates, and then restarts over again so far as a candidate basic rejection history (4) or (2), or basic rejection history (1). T2 and T3 are also described in terms of cyclic rules. Table 5 shows that the optimal policy is a threshold rule as long as 92 2 93 > q. From these numerical results and the analytical results of the 0-,l-and 2-problems, we conclude this paper with a conjecture " If the sequence {qj; 1 < j 5 n} satisfies ql > q2 2 a > qn7 then the optimal policy remains a threshold rule7'.
APPENDIX A A.1 Proof of Lemma 2. 1
Let p(j17 J2, , jk; n I il, i2, , ik; r) be the joint probability that il-th best, i2-th best,. -, and ik-th best among the first r applicants are respectively jl-th best, j2-th best,. -, and jk-th best among all n applicants, where (i17 i2 , , ik} C Nr and (jl, j2, , jk) C Nn. That IS, p(j17j27-",3k;n 1 i i 7 i 2 , ---,it;?-) = P{A(r7il;n) = jl,A(r7&;n) = j , , . --, A ( r , i k ; n ) = j k } .
Then, from the simple combinatorial argument Lemma A.1
(ii)
Proof.
Straightforward from (A.1).
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let p(jl, j2, ,jk; n 1 il, i2, , it; r -1) be the joint probability that il-th best, i2-th best,. -, and ik-th best among the first r -1 applicants are respectively jl-th best, j2-th best, -, and jk-th best among all n applicants, provided that all offers given to these k applicants have been rejected. Then, by the Bayes formula,
We easily see that the probability distribution of Xr, given that ii-th best, h-th best,.. -, and ifc-th best among the first r -1 applicants are respectively jl-th best, j2-th best ,--, where summations with respect to (jii j2, i j k ) are taken over WrF1 (i\i & , ik).
A.2
Proof of Lemma 2. 2
The following lemma is concerned with another property of ar(il, , ik) and the proof is straightforward from Lemma A. l (ii). We write ar (il, , ik; n) to make explicit the dependence on n.
Lemma A. 2
For any s(2 < s < k),
where summations with respect to (js, , jk) are taken over Wr(is, ,q.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. We'll only derive sr ( l ; , ik) for action al, since others can be obtained in a similar
way. Suppose that we are in state ( l ; il, , ik) E Sr. Then the probability that the true ranks of the applicants constituting the rejection history are ji , . , jk is given by fi(jl, --,Ik; n I (il, , it)"!; r) (defined in (A.4) ). On the other hand, if the true ranks of these k applicants are jl, ,h, action a1 and the subsequent optimal continuation leads to a success with probability (iii) We first consider the case where qj is non-increasing in j and show (a) by induction k on r. For r = n, (a) is evident from an(il, --,G) = flt=l qif Assume that (a) holds for r. Then the result is immediate from (2.8) since each term of the right hand side, i.e., ((il, -, ik)Oi), is non-increasing in ^(l < t < k) from the induction hypothesis. Because (a) implies that a,. ((il, -, ik)Oi) < ar ((il, . , ik)Or) for 1 <:l < r, it follows that which proves (b). When qj is non-decreasing in j , all the inequalities involved in the above can be reversed.
2.4(ii) and Lemma 3.2. Considering that, from Lemma 2.3(iii) (b), Ml) is non-decreasing in r, we have from (B.5) and the assumption that r g G(1) that which proves r -1 @ G(1).
(iii) Assume that r G(+) for some r >: s(1). Then, from (3.6),
n On the other hand, from the definition of s(l), we have r E G(1) which implies from (3.7) 1
n r Thus, from (B.6) and (B.7), 1 P r -1 (ii) Assume that r G(+), then r @ G(1) from (i). Thus, from (3.6) and (3.7), Therefore, from (B.8) and (B.9), which proves r -1 G(+).
(iii) Assume that r G(1) for some r 2 S(+). Then, from (3.7), (B. 10)
On the other hand, from the definition of S(+), we have r E G(+) which implies from (3.6) r -1 (iii) (3.9) is obtained from (B.22) through V* = %(c)) = = Ko-1(4). rejected. Then at this moment the basic rejection history changes from (4) to (l)(see Figure   l (a)). Thus if the next candidate appears prior to r2, the optimal policy makes no offer due to (B -15) and accordingly the basic rejection history changes from ( l ) to ($), i.e., we restart over again with the basic rejection history (4) . Such change of the basic rejection history repeats itself as long as a candidate appears prior to r2. From time 7-2 onward, the optimal policy obviously makes an offer to each candidate successively. Thus the policy described in Theorem 3.5(i) turns out to be optimal.
(ii) For r 2 r2, (B.19) and (B.20) also hold and hence K(1) and K(4) are given by (B.21) and (B.22) respectively. Thus (3.12) follows by substituting (B.21) and (B.22) into (B.14).
For rl 5 r < r2, (3.6) and (3. 
